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Abstract—We investigate the performance of hedge funds in 
bull and bear equity markets. Covering the period from January 
1994 to December 2008, we find that each bull and bear market 
period has its dominant independent variables. Furthermore, the 
level of performance persistence is not significantly related to 
equity market conditions. The analyses show that hedge fund 
performance persistence is stronger in more recent sub-periods 
than in earlier sub-periods. In bullish as well as in bearish equity 
markets, performance persistence is driven by both constant 
winners and losers. Moreover, both live and dead funds exhibit 
statistically significant levels of performance persistence. 
Index Terms—equity markets; hedge funds; performance 
measurement; performance persistence 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
EDGE FUNDS are typically expected to generate positive 
returns irrespective of the directions of overall financial 
markets. In this regard, hedge fund performance relies, at least 
to a certain extent, on the managers’ skills, experience and 
trading strategy. This paper analyzes the performance of hedge 
funds, focusing on the performance persistence of hedge funds 
during bull and bear equity markets. Based on a large sample 
obtained from Hedge Fund Research (HFR) database, we find 
no indication that hedge fund performance persistence is 
significantly related to equity market conditions. In fact, the 
results indicate that hedge funds exhibit performance 
persistence in both bear and bull equity markets. However, our 
results also show that performance persistence is significantly 
lower when equity market conditions change (i.e., from bull 
market to bear market or vice versa). Calculating rankings with 
respect to the relative levels of statistical significance among 
sub-periods, we find that the funds in more recent sub-periods 
exhibited higher levels of performance persistence than the 
funds in the earlier sub-periods. Furthermore, we find that 
performance persistence of live funds is primarily driven by 
constant winner funds, while persistence of dead funds is 
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Our results document that the aggregate level of hedge fund 
performance persistence is largely independent of the equity 
markets but that some hedge funds perform significantly better 
or worse than their peers. Moreover, there is a momentum 
effect in hedge fund returns. As low levels of persistence in 
hedge fund performance often come along with changes in 
equity market conditions, winner hedge funds in bull markets 
do not necessarily remain winners in subsequent bear markets 
(or vice versa). In addition, we find evidence that constant loser 
funds exhibit a significantly higher probability of turning into 
dead funds. For these reasons, it is difficult to persistently 
generate outperformance relative to peers. As the dominant 
independent variables for explaining hedge fund performance 
change among the different sub-periods, our findings indicate 
alternating favorites across bull and bear markets. 
While several studies provide evidence that hedge funds 
exhibit statistically significant levels of performance 
persistence (Agarwal and Naik [1]; Kosowski, Naik and Teo 
[2]; Eling [3]), only few studies have examined the relationship 
between performance persistence and financial market 
conditions. Capocci, Corhay and Hübner [4], for instance, 
conduct an analysis for a bullish sub-period (from January 
1994 to March 2000) and a bearish sub-period (from April 
2000 to December 2002). Using a ranking based portfolio 
approach, they find that predictability is strongest among 
middle performers during the bullish period, while there is no 
evidence for persistent winners during the bearish period. 
Capocci and Hübner [5] focus on performance persistence 
during the Asian crisis and find that the top performing funds 
in the year before the Asian crisis had significantly lower 
returns in the first year of the crisis. Furthermore, their results 
do not confirm performance persistence at yearly horizons, 
neither for the best nor for the worst performing funds, but they 
do give limited evidence for middle-decile funds. In contrast, 
the results of Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov [6] show 
that performance persistence is strongly related to winner 
funds, while there is little evidence of persistence among loser 
funds. Edwards and Caglayan [7] do find evidence for 
performance persistence among winners and losers at the 12- 
and 24-month time horizons. 
In general, the results of empirical studies on hedge fund 
performance and persistence differ considerably, which is due 
to inconsistent data, methodologies, and investigation periods. 
In this context, several studies also emphasize the impact of 
data biases and investment trading restrictions. Baquero, Horst, 
and Verbeek [8] study performance persistence of hedge funds 
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with a special focus on the look-ahead bias, for instance. Their 
results indicate that hedge fund attrition is mainly driven by 
historical returns, and that attrition rates are significantly higher 
for funds that performed poorly in the past. Similar to Baquero 
et al., Malkiel and Saha [9] document substantial backfill and 
survivorship biases in hedge fund data. Correcting for these 
biases, they note that hedge funds exhibit considerably lower 
returns than commonly supposed. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 
[10] find that managerial incentives and the degree of 
managerial flexibility are positively related to hedge fund 
performance. Moreover, they show that hedge funds with 
higher managerial incentives as well as funds with greater 
managerial flexibility are more likely to be persistent winners. 
Gantenbein and Glatz [11] find that accounting for the advance 
notice period of hedge funds has a severe negative impact on 
performance persistence, as the proportion of statistically 
significant persistent funds decreases considerably, especially 
for short-term time horizons. 
Despite extensive research on the various aspects of the risk-
return persistence of hedge funds, little is known about its 
characteristics over time. In this respect, this paper differs from 
existing research in five key aspects: First, the investigation 
period covers a time period of 15 years including two bull and 
bear markets; second, the results are based on one of the largest 
samples ever used in academic research; third, beyond the all 
fund sample, the results are also reported for live and dead 
funds separately; fourth, the funds’ performance is analyzed 
using contingency table-based methodologies; and fifth, sub-
periods are further divided into stable and transition periods. 
Thus, our paper introduces several key modifications with 
respect to previous studies and provides new empirical 
evidence on hedge funds performance persistence. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
II describes the methodological framework, while section III 
explains the data and descriptive statistics. Section IV presents 
the results and section V concludes this study. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
In order to measure hedge fund performance, we use a multi-
factor model containing a set of capital-market and alternative 
factors. Applying stepwise backward regression to the 
aggregate sample including all funds (ALLHF), the following 
six variables are selected: MSCI Emerging Markets (MSEM), 
excess return on equity market (Rm-Rf), Barclays Capital 
Global High Yield (BCGHY), commodity market factor 
(GSCI), momentum factor (MOM), and size factor (SMB). The 
corresponding regression equation can be written as follows: 
 1 2 3
4 5 6
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 (1) 
Hereby, MSEM mimics the equity market performance in 
international emerging markets, while Rm-Rf provides a broad-
based measure for U.S. equity markets. BCGHY covers a 
significant part of the international high-yield fixed income 
markets, and by including GSCI the variation of commodity 
returns is accommodated. With the size factor (SMB) and the 
momentum factor (MOM), predictors are included that are able 
to add explanatory power regarding potential time-series 
variations in equity market returns. Overall, the model builds 
on the classic factor models as suggested by Fama and French 
[12] and Carhart [13]. It is also similar to other models used in 
hedge fund performance evaluation such as, e.g., proposed by 
Fung et al. [14]. 
Similar to other studies (e.g., Agarwal and Naik [1]; Malkiel 
and Saha [9]; Bonadurer [15]; Eling [3]), the testing 
methodology for performance persistence is based on 
contingency tables. These are employed in statistics to analyze 
the relationship between two or more variables. In the context 
of hedge fund performance, contingency tables can be used to 
identify winner and loser funds. Winners (W) are those funds 
performing better than the median fund, while losers (L) are 
funds performing worse than the median fund, respectively. 
Using the (net) return for measuring performance, a hedge fund 
is described as being a winner, if it has a higher return in a 
specific period than the median return of all funds within the 
same strategy and period. Following this logic, four potential 
outcomes are possible: winner and winner (WW), winner and 
loser (WL), loser and winner (LW), and loser and loser (LL). 
Persistence is indicated when a winner (loser) fund in the first 
period is also a winner (loser) fund in the second period (WW 
or LL). When winner (loser) funds of the first period become 
loser (winner) funds in the second period (meaning WL or LW 
outcomes), this is an indication of missing persistence. 
In general, we analyze the performance persistence at an 
aggregate fund level, meaning that the results of the individual 
funds (i.e., the number of WW, WL, LW, and LL outcomes) 
are pooled within a specific hedge fund strategy and presented 
on a hedge fund strategy-level. In other words, at an aggregate 
level, the outcomes of the individual fund’s contingency tables 
flow into one pooled contingency table and are analyzed 
accordingly. Where N is the total number of observations (i.e., 
total number of WW, WL, LW, and LL), we use the following 
formula to calculate the chi-square statistic: 
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In order to determine the level of significance, the chi-square 
distribution with one degree of freedom is used. Thus, 2X  
values that are greater than 2.71, 3.84, and 6.63 indicate 
2 2 2 2
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significant persistence at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-confidence 
level, respectively. 
As a second statistical methodology for testing performance 
persistence, the cross-product ratio (CPR) test is applied. The 
CPR shows the relationship’s direction and its strength. In case 
of no persistence, each of the four categories WW, LL, WL, 
and LW should account for 25% of the outcomes. Hence, the 
null hypothesis of no performance persistence states that the 
CPR is equal to 1. Mathematically, the CPR is defined as 
follows: 
  (3) 
The statistical significance of the CPR can be tested by using 
the Z-statistic. Hereby, the ratio of the natural logarithm of the 
CPR is divided by the standard error of the natural logarithm. 
For testing the statistical significance of performance 
persistence, Z-statistics with a value greater than 1.64, 1.96, 
and 2.58 indicate significance at the 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level, 
respectively. The Z-statistic can be written as follows: 
  (4) 
For the investigation period used in our analysis (January 
1994 to December 2008, i.e., 180 months), a maximum number 
of 179 observations per fund (with a 1-month time horizon) can 
be considered. Within this paper, four different time horizons 
are analyzed: monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual 
horizons (1-, 3-, 6-, and 12-month horizons). 
Dividing the investigation period of 180 months into bull 
market periods and bear market periods, the lengths of the sub-
periods are selected according to the equity market conditions 
using the Russell 2000 Index as a proxy. More specifically, the 
following periods are analyzed separately (1-month horizon): 
01/1994 to 02/2000 (sub-period 1 or bull market I); 03/2000 to 
02/2003 (sub-period 2 or bear market I); 03/2003 to 05/2007 
(sub-period 3 or bull market II); 06/2007 to 12/2008 (sub-
period 4 or bear market II). Accounting for the specific end 
values related to the four different time horizons, the following 
additional sub-periods are created for testing performance 
persistence: 3-month horizon: (1) Q1 1994 to Q1 2000 (bull 
market I), (2) Q2 2000 to Q3 2002 (bear market I), (3) Q4 2002 
to Q2 2007 (bull market II), (4) Q3 2007 to Q4 2008 (bear 
market II); 6-month horizon: (1) H1 1994 to H1 2000 (bull 
market I), (2) H2 2000 to H2 2002 (bear market I), (3) H1 2003 
to H1 2007 (bull market II), (4) H2 2007 to H2 2008 (bear 
market II); 12-month horizon: (1) 1994 to 1999 (bull market I), 
(2) 2000 to 2002 (bear market I), (3) 2003 to 2006 (bull market 
II), (4) 2007 to 2008 (bear market II). 
With the analysis of performance persistence, each sub-
period is further divided into stable and transition periods. The 
transition period describes the breakpoint between two market 
conditions (e.g., the change from a bull market to a bear 
market). Having formed four sub-periods in total, three 
transition periods are observable: bull market I / bear market I 
(transition period I), bear market I / bull market II (transition 
period II), and bull market II / bear market II (transition period 
III). By focusing on these transition periods, it is possible to 
provide information on performance persistence when the 
general market regime changes. In contrast, stable periods only 
use the data from periods with virtually no market changes.  
III. DATA 
We use data from Hedge Fund Research (HFR) database. 
HFR is one of the most respected commercial hedge fund data 
vendors and is used in many academic studies (e.g., Liang [16]; 
Agarwal and Naik [17]; De Souza and Gokcan [18]; and Fung 
et al. [14]). The HFR database includes both on-shore and off-
shore funds and contains both single funds and fund of funds. 
Based on HFR’s live and dead fund database, the data consists 
of 12,036 funds (6,585 live funds and 5,451 dead funds) in the 
period of January 1994 to December 2008. In general, HFR’s 
strategy classification system distinguishes between five hedge 
fund strategies: Equity Hedge (EH), Event-Driven (ED), Macro 
(M), Relative Value (RV), and Fund of Funds (FOF).  
From the original dataset, only those funds that meet all the 
following requirements are included in the final sample: (i) 
funds must have reported complete return data from the 
inception date up to the fund’s extinction (for dead funds) or to 
the end of the investigation period (for live funds); (ii) funds 
must have reported assets under management of at least USD 
10 million or the equivalent in local currency in their most 
recent reporting; (iii) funds must report monthly return figures 
net of all fees; (iv) funds must have at least 24 months of 
complete return history; and (v) funds must only appear once in 
the final sample. This filtering process leads to a final sample 
of 4,788 hedge funds used in this paper. Out of this remaining 
total, 2,846 are live funds and 1,942 are dead funds. 
Table I shows the breakdown by the number of sample funds 
for each of the five hedge fund strategies. Equity Hedge (1,646 
or 34.38%) and Fund of Funds (1,439 or 30.05%) represent the 
two most important strategies. Furthermore the live-to-dead 
fund ratio mirrors the attrition rates of the funds. Fund of Funds 
(1.70) and Macro funds (1.68) display substantially lower 
attrition rates than the other hedge fund strategies. The average 
live-to-dead fund ratio is 1.47 over the investigation period, 
corresponding to 59.44% live funds and 40.56% dead funds in 
the final sample. 
TABLE I.  HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES 
 
This table reports the breakdown by number of sample funds for each of the five hedge fund 
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Total no. of 
funds Live funds Dead funds
Live-to-dead 
fund ratio
Equity Hedge 1,646 966 680 1.42
Event-Driven 419 232 187 1.24
Macro 616 386 230 1.68
Relative Value 668 356 312 1.14
Fund of Funds 1,439 906 533 1.70
All Funds 4,788 2,846 1,942 1.47
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live funds and dead funds, respectively. Column five reports the live-to-dead fund ratio which 
represents the relationship between the number of live and dead funds. 
The average length of a fund’s return data is 79.6 months 
(around 6.6 years). 25% of the sample funds have a return 
history equal to or greater than 108 months, while 30% report 
for less than 36 months. In total, the sample funds provide 
381,218 monthly returns. The return data show that unadjusted 
hedge fund performance is generally superior compared to 
most major equity market and bond market indices. The 
average mean return appears to be significantly higher for 
hedge funds than for equity market indices, for instance. 
Moreover, hedge fund returns exhibit negative skewness and 
excess kurtosis. In this respect, the risk-return characteristics 
are different among the five hedge fund strategies. 
IV. RESULTS 
In this section, we present the results of the performance 
measurement and performance persistence analysis. 
A. Performance measurement 
Table II displays the R-square, the F-value, the constant 
(intercept), and the significant coefficients at the 5%-level for 
the aggregate hedge fund samples over the four sub-periods. In 
general, the explanatory power of the six-factor model is 
relatively high. R-squared are between 75.37% and 92.26% for 
the all hedge fund sample (ALLHF). However, the values are 
higher for more recent sub-periods (bull market II and bear 
market II), and the explanatory power of the predictors is not 
constant over time. In fact, our results indicate that each sub-
period has its dominant drivers. In the first sub-period (01/1994 
to 02/2000), the excess return on equity market (Rm-Rf) and the 
size factor (SMB) display the highest levels of significance and 
are strongly present in most hedge fund strategies (EH, ED, 
and FoF). The second sub-period (03/2000 to 02/2003) is 
dominated by the excess return on equity market (Rm-Rf) and 
the global high yield index (BCGHY), while statistical 
significance in the third sub-period (03/2003 to 05/2007) is 
mainly driven by the emerging markets equity factor (MSEM). 
MSEM and the commodity market factor (GSCI) are the 
dominant factors in the fourth sub-period (06/2007 to 12/2008). 
While the results for the five hedge fund strategies display 
some time-varying behavior, it is obvious that a combination of 
equity, fixed income, and commodity market factors are quite 
reliable and powerful predictors of hedge fund returns. The 
only exception is the case of Macro funds, the performance of 
which cannot be adequately explained by the six-factor model. 
Obviously, Macro funds do not have a strong directional 
exposure to the traditional asset classes and therefore offer a 
different risk-return profile. 
The decreasing constant (intercept) over time (e.g., from 
0.93% over 0.75% and 0.39% to -0.26% for ALLHF) indicates 
that hedge funds’ abilities to generate superior risk-adjusted 
returns decreased over time. Moreover, the intercept fluctuates 
considerably, potentially as a consequence of different levels of 
unidentified risk exposure and time-varying performance. 
Additionally, we find that the level of autocorrelation is not 
constant over time. The Durbin-Watson test shows that the 
returns exhibit positive serial correlation in sub-periods 1 to 3, 
while there is even slightly negative serial correlation (Durbin-
Watson test of 2.32) in sub-period 4. However, no significant 
serial correlation of returns in sub-periods 1, 2, and 4 can be 
observed, in contrast to the observed serial correlation for sub-
period 3 (03/2003 to 05/2007). 
Overall, the results for the sub-periods confirm the findings 
of the entire investigation period. The null hypothesis that none 
of the variables are significant predictors needs to be rejected 
for the majority of cases. More specifically, over the entire 
investigation period of January 1994 to December 2008, all six 
parameters show statistical significance at the 5%-level. In the 
ALLHF sample, the smallest P-values of the independent 
variables are displayed for Rm-Rf, MSEM, and MOM, 
indicating a strong positive relationship between hedge funds 
and both global equity markets and momentum in returns. 
B. Performance persistence 
We find that at the aggregate level the sample funds exhibit 
performance persistence for all four analyzed time horizons. 
Furthermore, the percentage of individual funds exhibiting 
significant levels of performance persistence decreases with 
increasing time horizon. In fact, the proportion of persistent 
funds is highest at the 1-month horizon but lowest at the 12-
month horizon. In addition, we find no indication that the level 
of performance persistence is significantly related to the choice 
of performance measure, which we assessed using the return 
and Sharpe ratio separately. Regarding the test methodologies, 
the reported differences between the chi-square test and the 
cross-product test are insignificant at an aggregate fund level. 
Moreover, we find that live and dead funds exhibit different 
drivers of performance persistence. While persistence of dead 
funds is primarily driven by constant losers, persistence of live 
funds is mainly driven by constant winners. Both live and dead 
funds exhibit statistically significant levels of performance 
persistence over the investigation period of 15 years. 
In a next step, we subdivided the investigation period into 
two bull and two bear market periods. Three measurement 
values are considered: (a) chi-square (X2) value, (b) cross-
product ratio (CPR) value, and (c) Z-statistic (Z) value. 
Table III reports the aggregate results for the four sub-
periods at the 1-month horizon. Statistically significant levels 
of performance persistence can be found for all four sub-
periods. For example, the Z-statistic values range from 24.14 
(01/1994-02/2000) to 58.41 (03/2003-05/2007). The WW and 
LL observations in each sub-period are more frequent than WL 
and LW. The minimum percentage of the subsumed persistent 
observations (WW and LL) is 55.03% (1-month horizon), for 
instance. Compared to the results of the entire investigation 
period, we find that sub-periods 1 and 2 (bull market I and bear 
market I) exhibit lower levels of persistence, while sub-periods 
3 and 4 (bull market II and bear market II) exhibit higher levels 
of persistence, respectively. When using CPR-values as the 
ranking measure, the statistical significance increases from 
sub-period 1 to sub-period 3, while sub-period 4 exhibits a 
lower significance level than sub-period 3 but a higher level 
than sub-periods 1 and 2. Thus, performance persistence is 
stronger for the time after February 2003. 
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TABLE II.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
This table reports the R-square, the F-value, the constant (intercept), and the significant coefficients at the 5%-level for the aggregate hedge fund samples over the four sub-periods. Abbreviations: 
ALLHF: all hedge fund sample; EH: Equity Hedge; ED: Event-Driven; M: Macro, RV: Relative Value, FOF: Fund of Funds; MSEM: MSCI Emerging Markets; Rm-Rf: excess return on the equity 
market; BCGHY: Barclays Capital Global High Yield; GSCI: S&P GSCI Total Return Index; SMB: Small Minus Big factor; MOM: momentum factor. 
 
The results for the 3-month and 6-month horizons are similar 
(not reported here for reasons of space). The results at the 6-
month horizon indicate that performance persistence is stronger 
in bear markets. For the 12-month horizon, all four sub-periods 
exhibit statistically significant performance persistence at the 
5%-level. However, with respect to the ranking among the four 
sub-periods, we find that bear market II (2007-2008) exhibits 
the lowest level of persistence, which is different from the 
shorter time horizons. Furthermore, the drivers of performance 
persistence are different between the sub-periods when using 
the 12-month horizon. More specifically, sub-periods 1 and 2 
(1994-1999 and 2000-2002) are primarily driven by constant 
losers, while performance persistence of sub-period 4 (2007-
2008) is primarily driven by constant winners, for instance. In 
sub-period 3 (2003-2006), performance persistence is driven by 
both constant winners and losers alike. 
Regarding stable and transition periods, our results indicate 
that performance is more random at market breakpoints and 
statistically significant levels of persistence are less likely to 
occur. In contrast, the levels of performance persistence are 
higher within a general equity market trend than during periods 
of directional adjustment (from bull to bear market or vice 
versa). With respect to the financial crisis in bear market II, 
there is evidence of performance persistence at the 1-, 3-, and 
6-month horizons in the stable period. However, at the at 12-
month horizon the null hypothesis of no persistence cannot be 
rejected in the stable period, but has to be rejected in the 
transition period. In other words, the winner (loser) funds of 
2007 are generally not the winner (loser) funds of 2008, but 
2006 winner (loser) funds most likely also were 2007 winner 
(loser) funds. Obviously, during the financial crisis of 2007-
2008, hedge funds were unable to consistently under- or 
outperform their peers over a yearly horizon. 
For robustness checks, we ran the analyses for both live and 
dead funds separately. For all four sub-periods and for all four 
time horizons, both live and dead funds show statistically 
significant performance persistence at the 5%-level on an 
aggregate basis. The results for the four sub-periods provide 
further evidence that dead funds are primarily driven by 
constant losers, in particular within sub-period 4 (bear market 
II). More specifically, in period 06/2007-12/2008, 38.94% of 
all outcomes are LL among the dead funds at the 3-month 
horizon, for instance. This finding indicates that several funds 
exhibited constant negative performance in the financial crisis 
of bear market II and consequently had to leave the business 
(thereby becoming dead funds). Overall, we conclude that 
performance persistence is driven by constant losers (with dead 
funds) and constant winners (with live funds). Also with live 
funds and dead funds, the level of performance persistence is 
strongest for sub-period 3 (bull market II), confirming the 
finding of the all fund sample. Further, both live and dead 
funds generally display higher levels of persistence in stable 
periods than in transition periods. This also confirms the 
findings from the all fund sample. 
 
R-square
F-value (sig.) 39.62 (0.0000) 14.79 (0.0000) 37.14 (0.0000) 23.82 (0.0000)
Constant (std. error) 0.0093 (0.0011) 0.0075 (0.0011) 0.0039 (0.0009) -0.0026 (0.0025)
Sig. coefficients
R-square
F-value (sig.) 95.62 (0.0000) 25.55 (0.0000) 71.88 (0.0000) 36.41 (0.0000)
Constant (std. error) 0.0111 (0.0011) 0.0095 (0.0016) 0.0047 (0.0009) -0.0025 (0.0026)
Sig. coefficients
R-square
F-value (sig.) 37.39 (0.0000) 20.07 (0.0000) 21.34 (0.0000) 42.68 (0.0000)
Constant (std. error) 0.0099 (0.0012) 0.0070 (0.0012) 0.0080 (0.0011) -0.0035 (0.0020)
Sig. coefficients
R-square
F-value (sig.) 1.06 (0.3981) 0.87 (0.5264) 12.80 (0.0000) 2.15 (0.1220)
Constant (std. error) 0.0114 (0.0030) 0.0087 (0.0034) -0.0001 (0.0019) 0.0035 (0.0047)
Sig. coefficients
R-square
F-value (sig.) 13.13 (0.0000) 19.13 (0.0000) 11.49 (0.0000) 20.55 (0.0000)
Constant (std. error) 0.0092 (0.0009) 0.0091 (0.0006) 0.0057 (0.0006) -0.0014 (0.0027)
Sig. coefficients
R-square
F-value (sig.) 26.94 (0.0000) 11.88 (0.0000) 17.14 (0.0000) 16.15 (0.0000)
Constant (std. error) 0.0052 (0.0012) 0.0039 (0.0008) 0.0026 (0.0011) -0.0052 (0.0030)
Sig. coefficients
sub-period 1                 
(01/1994 to 02/2000)
sub-period 2                 
(03/2000 to 02/2003)
sub-period 3                 
(03/2003 to 05/2007)
sub-period 4                 
(06/2007 to 12/2008)
ALLHF
0.7801 0.7537 0.8351 0.9226
MSEM, Rm-Rf, BCGHY, SMB Rm-Rf, BCGHY MSEM, BCGHY, SMB MSEM, GSCI
EH
0.8954 0.8409 0.9074 0.9479
MSEM, Rm-Rf, SMB Rm-Rf, BCGHY MSEM, Rm-Rf, BCGHY, SMB MSEM, GSCI
ED
0.7700 0.8059 0.7443 0.9552
Rm-Rf, BCGHY, SMB, MOM Rm-Rf, BCGHY, SMB BCGHY, SMB Rm-Rf, GSCI
M
0.0863 0.1530 0.6357 0.5184
- - MSEM, GSCI -
RV
0.5404 0.7983 0.6104 0.9113
BCGHY, SMB BCGHY, SMB MSEM, BCGHY GSCI
FoF
0.7070 0.7109 0.7003 0.8898
Rm-Rf, BCGHY, SMB, MOM BCGHY, MOM MSEM MSEM, GSCI
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This study analyzes if hedge fund performance persistence is 
sensitive to the equity market environment. Based on the 
investigation period of January 1994 to December 2008, we 
find no indication that hedge fund performance persistence is 
significantly related to equity market conditions. However, we 
argue that the more recent sub-periods, in particular after 2002, 
exhibit higher levels of performance persistence than earlier 
sub-periods including both bull and bear markets. Furthermore, 
the levels of performance persistence are significantly higher 
when equity markets follow clear trends (stable periods) than 
when conditions change (transition periods). 
Overall, our results document a significant persistence in 
hedge fund returns on an aggregate basis. Using a six-factor 
regression model, we were able to explain a considerable 
proportion (R-squared between 75.37% and 92.26%) of the 
variation of hedge fund returns. However, the explanatory 
power of the predictors is not constant over time and depends 
on the hedge fund strategy. Our results indicate that each sub-
period has its dominant drivers. Furthermore, in the recent past, 
the bandwidth between below-average and above-average 
performers was larger, which is likely to be the result of the 
increased number of hedge funds. 
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